

MEMORANDUM

22 April 1946

TO: Colonel William W. Quinn

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Necessity for Integration or Coordination of SI and X-2 Functions.

1. This memorandum represents an analysis from the SI point of view of the essential relationship between the functions which X-2 performs or should perform and the overall clandestine intelligence program. It is strongly felt by SI that operations of an X-2 nature are indispensable to the maintenance of effective and secure positive intelligence work, and that a separation of foreign counter intelligence operations from foreign positive intelligence operations would be disastrous to the latter and hampering to the former.
2. The functions with which the X-2 Office is charged fall somewhat naturally into two main categories:
 - A. The collection and processing for the use of other American government agencies of intelligence directed at subversive individuals and particularly at representatives of foreign intelligence organizations abroad. Such information is essential to passport control work, prevention of subversive immigration, strengthening of internal American security from foreign intelligence penetration, etc.
 - B. The conduct of counter intelligence operations directed toward the protection of American foreign intelligence work. Such operations themselves fall into three specific categories:
 1. The collection and processing of biographical information for the purpose of vetting foreign personnel under consideration for use as agents or sub-agents in American foreign

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6. It should be apparent, furthermore, that such operations as those described above can only be successfully performed in closest coordination with the positive intelligence operations of the American service. disastrous results may be anticipated from a lack of this coordination; one need only envisage the diligent pursuit of American agent personnel by American counter intelligence personnel to whom their colleagues are unknown. Such actions would be useless and reprehensible at best, but in addition they constitute a serious danger to the success of the positive intelligence work. Lack of coordination may be due either to SI or I-2, but in either case the results are equally unfortunate and cannot be tolerated in a professional intelligence service.

7. The collection of what might be called positive counter-intelligence (described in A and B1 above) is in reality only a specialized or functional area of positive clandestine intelligence. It requires specialized personnel just as does the collection of technical or military or fiscal intelligence. But such specialization does not prevent and should not discourage the reporting of other types of intelligence to which, in the course of their operations, specialized operatives are exposed. Broad basic training in all intelligence fields should be provided for both SI and I-2 operatives in order to avoid such exclusive concentration as would require wasteful duplication of coverage. Joint planning, cooperative training, and the close coordination of staff operations of both SI and I-2 will inevitably eliminate such duplication of effort and of personnel, both staff and operative, and will result in more effective field operations. Such close coordination is only practicable when SI and I-2 function as a part of a single agency.

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8. Experience in CSC has shown that lack of close cooperation in I-2 and SI work is possible even when the two services operate from the same building. It should be obvious that if I-2 functions are to be handled by an entirely different agency, no favorable results at all could be expected. Any diversity of agency interests would militate against the success of a coordination which is essential. It is no exaggeration to say that if the I-2 function were to be divorced from positive intelligence work, the SI Office would be forced to establish its own I-2 operations. Out of such an unfortunate situation would arise additional governmental duplication and the possibility of a dangerous conflict of American counter intelligence services. Either represents a consummation to be abhorred.

CHIEF

cc: Mr. James Murphy

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel William W. Quinn
FROM: [Excised]
SUBJECT: Necessity for Integration or Coordination of SI and X-2 Functions

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2. The functions with which the X-2 Office is charged fall somewhat naturally into two main catagories:

- A. The collection and processing for the use of other American government agencies for intelligence directed at subversive individuals and particularly at representatives of foreign intelligence organizations abroad. Such information is essential to passport control work, prevention of subversive immigration, strengthening internal American security from foreign intelligence penetration, etc.
- B. The conduct of counter intelligence operations directed toward the protection of American foreign intelligence work. Such operations themselves fall into three specific catagories:
 - 1. The collection and processing of biographical information for the purpose of vetting foreign personnel under consideration for use as agents or sub-agents in American foreign

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[Excised]

6. It should be apparent, furthermore, that such operations as those described above can only be successfully performed in close coordination with the positive intelligence operations of the American service.

Ludicrous results may be anticipated from a lack of this coordination: one need only envisage the diligent pursuit of American agent personnel by American counter intelligence personnel to whom their colleagues are unknown. Such actions would be useless and reprehensible at best, but in addition may constitute a serious danger to the success of the positive intelligence work. Lack of coordination may be due to either SI or X-2, but in either case the results are equally unfortunate and cannot be tolerated in a professional intelligence service.

7. The collection of what might be called positive counter-intelligence (described in A and B1 above) is in reality only a specialized or functional area of positive clandestine intelligence. It requires specialized personnel just as does the collection of technical or military or fiscal intelligence. But such specialization does not prevent and does not discourage the reporting of other types of intelligence to which, in the course of their operations, specialized operatives are exposed. Broad basic training in all intelligence fields should be provided for both SI and X-2 operatives in order to avoid such exclusive concentration as would require wasteful duplication of coverage. Joint planning, cooperative training, and the close coordination of field operations of both SI and X-2 will inevitably eliminate much duplication of effort and of personnel, both staff and operative, and will result in more effective field operations. Such close coordination is only possible when SI and X-2 function as part of a single agency.

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8. Experience in OSS has shown that lack of close cooperation in X-2 and SI work is possible even when the two services operate from the same building. It should be obvious that if X-2 functions are to be handled by an entirely different agency, no favorable results at all could be expected. Any diversity of agency interests would militate against the success of a coordination which is essential. It is no exaggeration to say that if the X-2 function were to be divorced from positive intelligence work, the SI office would be forced to establish its own X-2 operations. Out of such an unfortunate situation would arise additional governmental duplication and the possibility of a dangerous conflict of American counter intelligence services. Either represents a consummation to be abhorred.

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[Excised]

cc: Mr. James Murphy

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